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Abstract: Eugene Rotwein wrote in his ‘Introduction’ to David Hume Writings 
on Economics that works on Hume’s economics have been primarily ‘internal’ stu-
dies. Beyond exploring Hume’s insights for understanding economic phenomena, 
they have investigated either the relations between his philosophical thought and 
his economic analysis or emphasised their psychological and historical elements. 
The perspective in this paper is ‘external’, dealing with Hume’s economic thought 
according to Michel Foucault’s approach to history. Foucault sees the ‘interiority’ 
of thought as a doubling of what is outside of thought. It is in this sense that Fou-
cault investigates Hume’s context according to the concept of ‘episteme’, defining 
this as a set of relations that determines the ways of thinking. Foucault located 
Hume within the ‘classical episteme’ and I explore here his characterisation of that 
moment in order to understand the historical conditions of possibility of Hume’s 
economic thinking
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A Configuração Epistêmica do Pensamento 
Econômico de Hume
Resumo: Eugene Rotwein escreveu em sua ‘Introdução’ ao David Hume Writings 
on Economics que trabalhos sobre a economia de Hume têm sido primordialmente 
estudos ‘internos’. Além de constituírem uma exploração das idéias de Hume sobre 
o entendimento dos fenômenos econômicos, tais estudos têm tanto investigado 
as relações entre o seu pensamento filosófico e suas análises econômicas, quanto 
enfatizado seus elementos psicológicos e históricos. A perspectiva deste artigo é 
‘externa’, tratando do pensamento economic de Hume a partir da abordagem à 
história de Michel Foucault. Foucault via a ‘interioridade’ do pensamento como um 
duplo do que está fora dele. Foi neste sentido que Foucault investigou o context de 
Hume de acordo com a noção de ‘episteme’, definindo esta como um conjunto de 
relações que determinam as formas de pensar. Foucault localizou Hume dentro da 
‘episteme clássica’ e eu exploro aqui sua caracterização de maneira a melhor entender 
as condições de possibilidade do pensamento econômico de Hume. 




As Eugene Rotwein had already observed in the ‘Introduction’ of his David 
Hume Writings on Economics, works on the Hume’s economic writings 
have been primarily ‘internal’. They have been exploring either the relations 
between his philosophical thought and his economic analysis or emphasising 
their psychological and historical elements. And as the same author had also 
already pointed out, Hume was a thinker whose economic writings have a 
deep connection with his philosophical system (others who argue that are, 
for example, Wennerlind 2004; Schliesser 2004; Caffentzis 2001; Gruene 
and McClennen 2004). Rotwein remarked: ‘Indeed, it is proper to regard 
his [Hume’s] philosophical perspective as the most important internal factor 
shaping his appraisal of the different aspects of prevailing economic doctrine 
and his approach to the various issues of his period’ (Rotwein 1955: xvii). 
One remarkable exception to this kind of approach is Sheila Dow’s Hume 
and the Scottish Enlightenment: two cultures (Dow, 2009), in which she 
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investigates the influences of the Gaelic epistemology on Hume and Scottish 
Enlightenment thought.   
This paper follows Sheila Dow’s approach, intending to be an ‘external’ study 
on Hume. It deals with Foucault’s proposal of discerning the historical condi-
tions of possibility of Hume’s economic thought2. In his 1966 work The Order 
of Things (OT here after), Foucault developed an archaeology3 of the human 
sciences, which comprised also an archaeology of the political economy. 
Foucault wondered about the possibility of economics having historically 
followed a kind of ‘well-defined regularity’:
[I] f  empir ica l  knowledge,  at  a  g iven t ime and in  a  g iv-
e n  c u l t u r e ,  d i d  p o s s e s s  a  w e l l - d e f i n e d  r e g u l a r -
ity? If the very possibility of recording facts, of allowing 
oneself to be convinced by them, of distorting them in traditions 
or of making purely speculative use of them, if even this was not 
at the mercy of chance? If errors (and truths), the practice of 
old beliefs, including not only genuine discoveries, but also the 
most nanaïveotions, obeyed, at a given moment, the lanalysis of 
wealths of a certain code of knowledge? If, in short, the history of 
non-formal knowledge had itself a system? That was my initial hy-
pothesis - the first risk I took. (OT: ix-x - emphasis in the original)
 
Foucault concluded that there was indeed a regularity, whose fundamental 
arrangement he denominated the ‘episteme’. The ‘episteme’ is a structure4 
that defines the conditions of possibility of at a given moment in time. It is 
either the one that expresses itself in a theory or the one that is implicit in 
practice. In this sense, the episteme is related to a certain perspective that 
determines the ways of theorising, of speaking, of reading, and so on. It is 
a ‘structure’ through which Foucault analysed what is said according to the 
relations of same-other, to the notion of language and representation, to the 
position of time (history) and space as the foreground and/or background 
of the subject-mattter, and the conception of man’s finitude. Representation 
2  The argument here is that I will follow Foucault’s approach of Hume’s context and, in this sense, from 
‘outside’. But it must be noticed that this idea concerns the ‘folds’ in the work of Foucault, where ‘the “interior-
ity” of thought is seen as a doubling of what is outside of thought’, as Carrette (2000: 3) stressed.
   
3  Foucault employed the method of the ‘archaeology’ in his earlier works. He mentioned that he had bor-
rowed the term ‘archaeology’ from Kant (Bernauer 1990: 45). In the whole of Foucault’s work, ‘archaeology’ 
is indeed a part of a major tactic, the genealogy, procedure founded on Nietzsche’s philosophy and widely 
used by Foucault, as he intended to rescue the emergence of certain historical events. It does not matter to 
the archaeologist of knowledge if an enunciate is true or false at the discursive level, but ‘to see historically as 
the truth effects are produced inside the discourse that are not in themselves neither true nor false’ (Foucault, 
1984, p.60). 
  
4  Although the use of the word ‘structure’ can be controversial because it relates Foucault to the movement 
of ‘structuralism’, I use it here not in the sense usually related to the movement, that is, a ‘structure’ that is 
given, determined, and it is the same in all ages. It has been argued that what differentiates Foucault from 
‘structuralism’ is the fact that for him ‘episteme’ is no a priori, being indeed spatiotemporal. 
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corresponds to the relations between subjects (through words – language) 
and objects (things). 
Foucault used the concept of ‘episteme’ in OT and discussed it in AK. In the 
AK, he defines episteme:
By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, 
at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemo-
logical figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way 
in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to 
epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and 
operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be 
subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the 
lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sci-
ences in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive 
practices. (AK, 211)
What was intriguing Foucault was the fact that some domains of knowledge 
have emerged almost at the same time. Particularly, the fact that the human 
sciences have arisen at the same period of history seemed to be very singular. 
He also believed that these sciences were only possible after the emergence 
of some empirical sciences: political economy, biology, and philology. How-
ever, in accordance with his discontinuist view of history, such domains of 
knowledge did not exist before the end of the 18th century. He denominated 
the empirical fields of the classical episteme that gave rise to those sciences 
by analysis of wealth, natural history, and general grammar respectively. 
Thus, OT was built in accordance with his believe that these heterogeneous 
discursive practices had a common underlying configuration, which defined 
their internal procedures. 
Foucault identified three historical periods marked by different epistemes: 
‘the age of resemblance’ until the end of the 16th century (pre-classic); ‘the age 
of representation’, or classical episteme, which included the period from the 
beginnings of the 17th century to the second half of the 18th century; ‘the age 
of history’ or Modern Era from the end of the 18th century until the present 
time. He located David Hume’s writings firmly within the classical episteme. 
Indeed, he stated that ‘Hume has only become possible’ (OT: 60)  because of 
that configuration of thought. I investigate here Foucault’s characterisation 
of that moment in order to understand the historical conditions of possibility 
of Hume’s economic thinking.
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2. Hume’s epistemic context 
2.1 General characterisation
Hume’s writings seemed clear in Foucault’s consciousness when he discerned, 
or constructed if you prefer, the characterisation of the classical episteme. 
Foucault describes that period as being ‘the age of representation’, whose ex-
pression was Descartes’s system, in particular through the project of a general 
science of order - mathesis universalis5. Nevertheless, it is almost impossible 
to refer to it without referring, at least briefly, to the previous episteme, which 
Foucault called ‘the age of resemblance’ (up to the end of the 16th century). 
Table 1 summarises Foucault’s characterisation of the epistemes.  
5  Here Foucault refers to the Descartes’s dream of founding a universal science with the help of mathemat-
ics. Mathesis universalis was Descartes’s designation to the science that would result from the application of 
a unified mathematical method. He enunciated this idea already in rule four of the Regulae: ‘there must be a 
general science which explains all the points that can be raised concerning order and measure irrespective of 
the subject-matter, and that this science should be termed mathesis universalis…’ (Descartes 1628: 19). The 
basic proposal was that knowledge should follow an itinerary/schedule from the ideas to the reality of things, 
being the first step to find just a unique certainty, a ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’ idea (‘innate’), from which it would be 
possible to derive, by deduction, all knowledge. In his own philosophical project, this idea - axiom - was the 
Cogito. Therefore, the procedure should mirror itself on the sciences of mathematics. Descartes declared in 
the Discourse on Method: ‘Those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasonings, which geometers 
customarily use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations, had given me occasion to suppose that all the 
things which can fall under human knowledge are interconnected in the same way’ (Descartes 1637: 120). 
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TABlE 1. THE THREE EpISTEMES - MAIN CHARACTERISTICS: SAvOIR.  
Essential Elements
Episteme – Configuration of Knowledge
Pre-Classical: 






Modern: from the 
end of the eigh-
teenth century to 
today
General character Age of Simili-tude
Age of Representa-




Mode of Knowledge 
Interpretation of 
signs given by 
God
Representation: 
signs are formed 
during the processo 
f knowledge. The 




Things’s Mode of 
being 
Similitude Order History
Main Procedure Analogy Analysis and order-ing; tabulation
Analogy and suc-
cession; not tabula-
tion, but a sequen-









SOURCE: Authors own work based on Foucault’s OT. 
According to Foucault, until the end of that century, knowledge was a kind of 
‘mirror of nature’. Everything could be known through a set of connections 
of resemblances, which were printed on world by God. Resemblances were 
indeed God’s signature. Man’s task was to find them through detecting signs 
and finding analogies. For example, there were resemblances between the sky 
and the earth, relations between the composition of the sky and of the plants, 
and so on. There was nothing scattered in the world, things were linked one 
to the others per kinship and analogies. Divination and erudition, as Cou-
sins and Hussain (1984: 34) affirm, ‘are not different forms of knowledge,’ 
because they are both forms of interpretation. Knowing is not analysing, but 
interpreting. Knowing was to realize the same, that is, to become fully aware 
of that which was ‘both dispersed and related, therefore to be distinguished 
by kinds and to be collected together into identities’ (Foucault’s definition 
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for ‘the same’ - OT: xxiv). 
In the beginning of Hume’s episteme, resemblance started being regarded with 
suspicion, as an occasion of error. Bacon and Descartes became possible, inso-
far as the former criticised resemblance through the description of idols, while, 
for the latter, resemblance was ‘a confused mixture that must be analysed in 
terms of identity, difference, measurement and order’ (OT: 52). Language is 
not only something given by God. Although ‘the written word and things no 
longer resemble one another (…) language has not become entirely impotent’ 
(OT: 48). That is, the separation between words and things had led to two 
main consequences: a) the gap was filled by representation; b) and a theory 
of language had become possible and necessary. Indeed, the act of knowing 
became the search for a well-constructed language. ‘Knowledge (…) is like a 
language whose every word has been examined and every relation verified. To 
know is to speak correctly (…) The sciences are well-made languages, just as 
languages are sciences lying fallow’ (OT: 87). Language provides the ‘adequate 
signs for all representations’ (ibid: 85). That is why ‘language’ could and should 
be studied, and a theory of language emerged (grammar). But language had a 
different conception from that which it was to have in our age. Indeed, it was 
not ‘language’ that was studied, but ‘discourse’6 understood as ‘a sequence 
of verbal signs’ (OT: 83). Discourse was studied as a verbal performance of 
language, as the first representation of thought. And until then, language is 
able to represent. There is no thought in terms of its limitations. ‘Criticism’ 
in the classical episteme just analyses language ‘in terms of truth, precision, 
appropriateness, or expressive value’ (OT: 80).  
Knowing is not to try to connect things anymore, but ‘to discriminate’. What 
was privileged was the space occupied by things in a sort of plan. To know 
was to organise them in a kind of table, in which identities and differences 
(the relations between the same and the other) should be identified. That 
was Descartes’s general science of order. Order was the ‘mode of being’ of 
things (OT: 219). For example, in relation to the study of living beings (natu-
ral history), knowing consisted of describing them, ordering them, putting 
them in a table in accordance with their structure and character. This was 
done following four variables: form, number, arrangement, and magnitude. 
living beings should be classified in kingdoms, species, families, genera, and 
so on. 
Science broke off from history, because it had only led to obscurity, confusions 
and disagreements. Here, Foucault’s statement does give rise to doubts when 
dealing with Hume. As it is well known, Hume had a great interest in history, 
6  By ‘discourse’, Foucault does not mean what is built and operates through institutions, as he will under-
stand it in later works. Discourse in the classical age was ‘the spontaneous analysis of representation’ (OT: 232). 
Foucault will use ‘’discourse’ as ‘all the forms and categories of cultural life, including, apparently, his own efforts 
to submit this life to criticism’ (White 1979: 82), as ‘bodies of knowledge’ and ‘disciplines’. ‘Disciplines’ will be 
used in the meaning of scholarly disciplines, such as economics, science, medicine, etc., and ‘institutions’ of 
social control, such as prison, school, hospital, etc. (McHoul and Grace 1993: 26). It is only in the modern age 
that the emergence of man as a subject and object of knowledge led to ‘discourse’ in such meanings. 
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which resulted from his empiricism. Indeed he was recognised for a long time 
by his History of England and he used historical data very frequently, inclu-
ding in his writings about economy, in order to support his theories. 
However, the case is what Foucault means by ‘history’ here. He is saying that 
the ‘history of knowledge’ was neglected in the period. For example, plato 
and Aristotle should not be studied anymore because they were something 
of the past that had only led to different opinions. Knowledge should restart 
everything, concentrating on the visibilities of things. Although it can be ar-
gued that Hume, following a tendency of the Scottish Enlightenment, studied 
many of the past thinkers, who did influence his thinking, he mainly used 
history as a source of data that inspired his investigations and supported his 
conclusions.  
In the classical period, order and analysis replaced interpretation, while 
representation replaced resemblance. However, although resemblance was 
not the central category of knowledge anymore, it was kept as ‘an indispensable 
border of knowledge’ (OT: 67). Ordering would not be possible if it were not 
possible to group some of the perceptions according to resemblances among 
them. ‘For no equality or relation of order can be established between two 
things unless their resemblance has at least occasioned their comparison’ 
(OT: 67). And resemblance could only be established by imagination, given 
that ‘[w]ithout imagination, there would be no resemblance between things’ 
(OT: 69). Resemblance and imagination formed the fundamental pair that 
allowed the discrimination of identities and differences. Foucault evokes 
Hume in order to stress the role of imagination for knowledge. Imagination 
was the operation of mind that allowed one to deal with a certain ‘mechanics 
of the image in time’ (OT: 69). 
In the project of comparing and ordering things, the thought of classical 
episteme had essentially two kinds of problems. First, it had to deal with a 
(‘interpenetrating’) confused mixture of things. Second, although the order 
was confused, it could be glimpsed in the form of ‘resemblances, vague si-
militudes’ (OT: 69). Imagination was what allowed ordering by bringing to 
mind, even involuntarily, resonances that could form a table of comparisons. 
And so, the relation to time resullts from the fact that that jumbles of thin-
gs involves that things occur or are presented to the mind linearly in time. 
However, when the table is being constructed, it is necessary to bring them 
together at the same moment in time. This is clearly a reference to Hume’s 
conception. As Norton (1993) remarks, imagination for Hume is a faculty that 
allows ‘compounding’ impressions with the abstract ‘ideas’ of time and space. 
Hume argued that, although we have ‘ideas’ of space and time, we have no 
impression of space and time. Imagination was what allowed us, for Hume, to 
compound impressions in time and space, because it ‘achieves what neither 
the senses nor reason can achieve’, says Norton (idem: 9).  
There was a fundamental change concerning the nature of the sign at the 
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beginning of the 17th century. Until then, God had created all things and 
put his signature on them. Since then, the sign was to be conceived as being 
constituted as such only during the process of knowledge. ‘Now signs are 
knowledge, tools of analysis and means of representing order’ (Cousins & 
Hussain 1984: 33). According to Foucault, this fact and its consequences 
concerning the relation between a sign and that which it signifies must be 
analysed in accordance with three variables, which, again, clearly refer to 
Hume’s philosophy. First, the certainty of the relation: sign became certain 
or probable. Because the signifying function of a sign only took place in the 
process of knowledge, it could be certain or a probable connection of meanings 
does not correspond necessarily to a relation of cause and effect, but only to 
an indication and to the relation of a sign to what it signifies. In this sense, 
the relation of causation can be questionable, as is clearly identified in the 
Hume’s problem of causation. Second, the type of relation: a sign may belong 
to the whole that it denotes or can be separated from it. It is only through 
analysis that a sign can become apparent. Foucault states: ‘because the mind 
analyses, the sign appears’ (OT: 61), and, at the same time, a sign plays the 
role of instrument of analysis. After being established as such, a sign could 
be deployed to further impressions as it was in a grid. And third, the origin of 
the relation: a sign may be natural or conventional. Although this had already 
been in plato, for example, the change was that an artificial sign could not 
keep its fidelity to a natural sign in order to be believable in knowledge. One 
more difference was in that, ‘man-made signs’ were thought to be superior. 
This idea of the creation of ideal conventional signs led, in that moment of 
history, to the ambition of creating a transparent language. It is in this sense 
that knowing was understood as the building of a taxonomy, given that kno-
wledge was synonymous with ‘well-constructed language’.        
Therefore, at the level of the most elementary conditions of possibility, 
Foucault argues that Hume only became possible after this change in the 
organization of sign that occurred in the beginning of the 17th century and 
that happened because of the breaking off from divinatio. The key features of 
Hume’s system can be seen delineated in this Foucault’s characterisation: 
…the dissociation of the sign and resemblance in the early seventeenth 
century caused these new forms - probability, analysis, combination, 
and universal language system - to emerge, not as successive themes 
engendering one another or driving one another out, but as a single 
network of necessities. And it was this network that made possible 
the individuals we term Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, or Condillac. (OT: 
63)
And so, Foucault writes:
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The knowledge that divined, at random, signs that were absolute and 
older than itself has been replaced by a network of signs built up step 
by step in accordance with a knowledge of what is probable. Hume 
has become possible. (OT: 60)
Insofar as knowledge can be uncertain, Hume introduced the case of proba-
bility. Russell (1946) explains Hume’s understanding of probability: 
Hume does not mean by ‘probability’ the sort of knowledge contained 
in the mathematical theory of probability, such as that the chance 
of throwing double sixes with two dice is one thirty-sixth.(…). What 
Hume is concerned with is uncertain knowledge, such as is obtained 
from empirical data by inferences that are not demonstrative. This 
includes all our knowledge as to the future, and as to unobserved 
portions of the past and present. In fact, it includes everything except, 
on the one hand, direct observation, and, on the other, logic and 
mathematics (Russell 1946: 689)
2.2 The economic thought in the classical episteme
Despite the unity of knowledge projected in a mathesis universalis, there were 
two basic ways to pursue knowledge: mathesis or taxonomia. Mathesis was 
the science of calculable order; in other words, mathesis was applied when 
dealing with ‘simple natures’, aspects of reality susceptible to a quantitative, 
mathematical treatment. In the case of ‘complex natures’, that is, the empi-
rical domains of knowledge, a taxonomia was pursued. And, unlike mathesis 
(algebra), taxonomia did not have a pre-established method, and so it had 
to create a system of signs (OT: 72) in order to apply it. ‘What algebra is to 
mathesis, signs, and words in particular, are to taxonomia: a constitution 
and evident manifestation of the order of things’ (OT: 203). The empirical 
domains of knowledge of general grammar, natural history and analysis of 
wealth pursued a taxonomia of their objects. Thus, the economic analysis was 
a taxonomia and Foucault argues that ‘mercantilism’, chronologically deli-
mited by Scipion de Grammont and Nicolas Barbon (1637- ?1698), provided 
the necessary system of signs. 
Hume’s economic writings were inserted in that configuration of thought in 
which the basic signs were created by ‘mercantilism’. Although Hume had 
great disagreements with ‘mercantilists’, and indeed aimed to expose their 
errors, he was within the same configuration of possibilities of thought. This 
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was because, essentially, ‘mercantilism’ brought the thinking of price and mo-
ney to the level of representations and established a system of signs in which 
wealth could be analysed into elements that permitted relations of equality 
or inequality and signify itself by means of those completely comparable ele-
ments of wealth called precious metals. At the same time, the idea was that 
all kinds of wealth in the world were related one to another in so far as they 
were part of a system of exchange. So, Foucault emphasises, in this system 
of signs ‘there is no autonomous act of signification, but a simple and endless 
possibility of exchange’ (OT: 179-80). money, the sign of wealth, just had 
value in exchange. Therefore, economic thought happened inside a space of 
‘circular and surface causality’ in which everything is composed of reciprocal 
relations between what was representing and what was represented. That is, 
there were explanations of how money could flow into a country or out of 
it, how prices rose or fell, how production grew, stagnated, or diminished. 
But all these ‘movements’ obeyed a kind of tabulated process, in which all 
values were able to represent one another. more precisely, prices increased 
when the representing elements (money) increased faster than the elements 
represented (commodities), production diminished when the instruments of 
representation (money) diminished in relation to the things to be represented 
(commodities), and so on.  
‘Wealth’ was something that should be analysed and ordered in discourse. 
Indeed, ‘wealth’ was a ‘general domain’, ‘the ground and object’ of economy. 
It was ‘the domain of needs’ and Foucault declared that William petty and 
David Ricardo marked its chronological frontiers (OT: 57). That is, Petty be-
gan the classical episteme and Ricardo started the modern age in economic 
thought. Hume’s economic writings on money, trade, interest, population, 
and so on, had as the central motivation the process of creation of wealth. 
Eugene Rotwein, in the ‘Introduction’ of David Hume Writings on Econo-
mics, stated that ‘the most basic level of Hume’s economic thought takes the 
form of a natural history of the “rise and progress of commerce” in which he 
seeks to explain the development of economic activity through the impact of 
changing environmental forces on certain human passions’ (Rotwein, 1955, 
p. xxxii - emphasis added). This statement from Rotwein is particularly in-
teresting because it is reminiscent of the analogy to natural history that was 
underlined by Foucault.   
As Foucault states, economic thought was focused on theories of value, money 
and prices. It started with the same problem of economic thinking during the 
previous episteme (up to the end of the 16th century - ‘the age of resemblan-
ce’): how to understand money and its relation to prices in exchange. Hume’s 
economic analyses were dealing with the major questions of his period, as 
the titles of his essays attest: Of Money, Of Interest, Of Commerce, Of the 
Balance of Trade, and so on. He especially focussed on the impact of money 
in an economy and in the trade between/among nations.      
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For Foucault, the fundamental distinction of Hume’s economic context from 
the previous episteme was exactly in the conception of money. In the ‘age of 
resemblance’, the ability of money to measure price and to be the unity of 
exchanges rested upon its intrinsic value. Money was made of precious me-
tals and they were wealth and a mark of it. The metals were useful to coinage 
because they themselves had a price. money had value in its own right and, 
because of this, it was able to function as a sign in exchanges. Money was a 
sign because it has value by itself and by its resemblance with what it puts 
value on. money was a sign signifying because of its resemblance to that 
which it signified. According to Foucault, this was the case until Davanzatti 
(1529-1606), who was the last figure of the ‘age of resemblance’. However, 
in Hume’s period, the value of money was not intrinsic to it. Its value will be 
just in its function as a sign, because it ‘represents’ the value of other things. 
For example, the usual criticism to ‘mercantilism’ for equating money with 
wealth is unfair, because it has been attributing to ‘mercantilism’ something 
that it really could not understand. For ‘mercantilism’, there was not the 
dilemma between ‘money as a commodity or as sign’. Money was just a sign. 
money was what permitted wealth to be represented. If such a sign did not 
exist, wealth ‘would remain immobile, useless, and as it were silent’ (OT: 177). 
Gold and silver, as universal signs, become scarce and unequally distributed 
commodities. ‘money cannot signify wealth without itself being wealth. But 
it becomes wealth because it is a sign’ (OT: 177).   
Wealth was not anymore the preciousness of metals, but it was constituted of 
everything that was object of need, utility, pleasure or rarity. money became 
just a sign, a representation without own value. money has value just as the 
representation of the wealth in exchange and circulation. Wealth increases 
because goods can circulate through money and then multiply. 
In Of Money, Hume explored the relationship between the money supply and 
economic growth. As Wennerlind (2004) argues, Hume wanted to convince 
the legislator that money should be ‘ignored’, calling attention to the fact that 
wealth is created by the nation’s people and industry. And there is no doubt 
that, unlike the thinkers of the 16th century, Hume saw wealth as something 
distinct from the preciousness of metals, that is, he did not identify money 
and wealth. For him, money was only an instrument in exchange and, as 
Foucault characterises the classical episteme, Hume did understand ‘money 
as a pledge’. 
Foucault characterises the theory of money and trade as being a horizontal 
investigation of the process of exchange, i.e., it investigates the relations be-
tween/among things or kinds of wealth. money is conceived as a pledge. Both 
upholders of ‘money-as-sign’ and of ‘money-as-commodity’ defined ‘money as 
a pledge’. ‘Money is a material memory, a self-duplicating representation, a 
deferred exchange’ (OT: 181). Because money is a deferred exchange, it has to 
be a pledge. Because money was seen as a pledge, the ideas of money-as-sign 
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and money-as-commodity both emerged. The difference between them was 
in that they considered to be a pledge: money-as-sign (Law and partisans) 
- money should be guaranteed by some merchandise exterior to monetary 
pledge (for example, land) or by the prince; money-as-commodity - money 
would be guaranteed as if it was coined with precious metals.
Indeed, Hume’s conception of money does agree with this characterisation. 
In the very beginning of his Of Money: ‘money is not, properly speaking, one 
of the subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which men have agreed 
upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another’ (Hume  1970: 
33). Hume did believe that money could be comprised of any material. He 
argued in favour of metallic substance because he believed that ‘its scarcity 
provides a built-in discipline that facilitates the maintenance of confidence 
in the continued exhangeability of the currency’ (idem: 33). He even used the 
term ‘representation’ to refer to the role of money. For example, in Of Money 
he stated: ‘It is indeed evident, that money is nothing but the representation of 
labour and commodities, and serves only as a method of rating or estimating 
them’ (idem: 37). Or in Of Interest: ‘But as these metals [golden and silver] 
are considered chiefly as representations, there can no alteration arise, from 
their bulk or quantity, their weight or colour, either upon their real value or 
their interest’ (idem:  48). Although the quantity theory of money had already 
emerged in the 16th century, it had different meanings. For Davanzatti and 
Bodin (16th century - ‘age of resemblance’), there was an intrinsic devaluation 
of money because of the inflow of metals from America, causing an abundance 
of them in the Europe. However, at the end of the 17th century, the quantity of 
money was thought of (by locke, for example) as a proportion of the whole 
trade. money began to be thought of as a sign, which was representative of 
wealth (OT: 183). 
moreover, according to Foucault, what articulated wealth was a system of 
exchange, that is, kinds of wealth were related one to another insofar as they 
all were part of a system of exchange. In this sense, value just existed within 
the process of exchange. There were basically two strands of thinking about 
value. Both were in the same ‘theoretical segment’ according to Foucault. 
The difference between them was in the way they looked at exchange. These 
strands were: the ‘utilitarians’ with their ‘psychological theory’ (Condillac & 
Galiani & Graslin); and the physiocrats. The former analysed value as ante-
rior to the exchange and as a primary condition without which the exchange 
could not take place. The latter analysed value in the act of exchange itself. 
For physiocrats, exchange must exist in order for value and wealth to become 
possible. Quesnay and his disciples analysed wealth on the basis of what is 
given in exchange. They began their analyses with the thing itself which the 
exchage was designated in value, but which existed prior to the system of 
wealth  (OT: 195). value and wealth only exist if exchange is possible. And 
exchange creates value. The psychological school and the physiocrats em-
ployed the same mode of analysis. The difference was the point of origin and 
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the direction each one chose ‘to traverse a network of necessity that remains 
identical in both’ (OT: 191).
As in Hume’s economic essays, Foucault argues that circulation became one 
of the fundamental categories of analysis. For Hobbes, for example, the circu-
lation of money happened with duties and taxes; the state could redistribute 
it among private persons in the form of pensions, salaries, or remuneration 
for provisions bought by the state. It would stimulate the exchange of wealth, 
manufactures and agriculture. Just because of the space opened up by the 
relations between money and signs, wealth and representation, that it was 
possible to employ the metaphor of the circulation of the blood that had been 
recently developed. 
For Foucault, there was a kind of circularity in economic thought, insofar as 
‘everything happens in terms of the reciprocal relations between what was 
representing and what was represented’ (OT: 255), as I have already men-
tioned here. ‘value’ was understood in terms of a system of exchange. The 
understanding of this statement becomes easier if we refer here to the modern 
episteme. In Foucault’s view, the main difference in the modern age is that 
‘value’ will be seen as a result of the productive power of labour. Ricardo was 
the first economist to present this conception. With him, labour started being 
the only source of  ‘value’. Therefore, there was no need for relating one value 
to another one in exchange. In this sense, ‘value’ was not to be a sign in a 
network of representations, as it was the case during the classical age. 
In other words, Foucault is saying that in Hume’s economic writings, ‘value’ 
was still a function of a network of representations, it was still a sign. This se-
ems the case in Hume’s economic analysis. Although Hume sometimes refers 
to ‘labour’, he did not make a clear relation between labour and value, as was 
the case in Smith and in the modern episteme. In Of Commerce, for example, 
Hume does state that: ‘Every thing in the world is purchased by labour; and 
our passions are only causes of labour’ (Hume 1970: 11). However, he did not 
develop a theory of value having labour as the source, keeping his analyses 
within a set of representations.  
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3. Why was Hume not a ‘modern’ thinker? 
3.1 Modern episteme: general characterisation
In the pre-classical episteme, to know was to interpret meanings given by 
God to the things. In the classical episteme, knowledge was possible through 
language. In the modern episteme, representation could no longer provide the 
foundation of knowledge by itself. Words are not signs representing things 
themselves, whatever they are. Words signify an interpretation of the things, 
as was the case before the end of the 16th century, but with the great difference 
that words interpret meanings not given by God, but by man. In this sense, it is 
a self-representation, and because of that, there are always hidden meanings, 
unconscious elements, which have to be investigated, and will become the 
object of the emergent human sciences (psychology, sociology and the analy-
sis of literature and myth). Signs from now on will have hidden meanings. 
moreover, the foundation of knowledge will reside ‘outside representation, 
beyond its immediate visibility, in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even 
deeper and denser than representation itself’ (OT: 239). It may be said that, 
while in the pre-classical episteme ‘creation’ was the main figure underlying 
thought, this was replaced by ‘the order of things’ in the classical age, and in 
the modern episteme, ‘man’ plays this central role. According to Foucault, 
‘Man’ emerged for knowledge. This involves thinking about both the conscious 
and unconscious in the figure of man, so human sciences emerged.  
In contrast to the classical age that looked at the exterior of things, it is now 
necessary to look at the deepness of the objects. Things started being conceived 
as having an ‘internal architecture’. In economics, ‘labour’ had to be thought 
of in terms of forms of production. 
This shift in the way of thinking occurred during the years between 1775 and 
1825, which can still be divided into two stages divided by 1795/1800. Before 
1775, to know was to represent the visible - discriminating it, and unveiling 
its order. During the years from 1775 to 1795-1800, one invisible element was 
added to the analysis in each one of those empirical domains: labour by Adam 
Smith, organic structure by Jussieu, and word inflection by Cordeoux and 
William Jones. Nevertheless, during this phase, knowing is still a represen-
tation: a representation of this invisible element. It was only after 1795/1800 
that the representation really collapsed.  
The definite shift (between 1795/1800 and 1825) was promoted by David Ri-
cardo (1772-1823), Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), and Franz Bopp (1791-1867). 
Although they did not introduce the concepts of labour, organic structure 
and word inflection to their disciplines, they definitely removed them from 
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the structure of the classical thought, transforming the discourse. This trans-
formation of discourse reflected a change in the conception of the mode of 
being of labour, life and language. While in the classical thought they were 
conceived as having an underlying order, in the modern thinking they will be 
envisioned as a historical process.
Foucault employed the expression ‘organic structures’ not only to characterise 
the focus of biology, but also of political economy and philology in the modern 
era, because these positivities will be looking for understanding the internal 
relation between/among elements of their object in order to apprehend their 
functions. If one compares to the classical episteme, knowledge will not be to 
find identities and differences according to the visibility of things. Analogy 
and succession will be the ‘organising principles’. Neither a taxonomia of 
non-quantitative orders nor a table will constitute knowledge. The space of 
order was shattered, says Foucault, and knowledge panorama will consist 
of: things having own organic structures, space that articulates them, time 
that produces them, and representation, in which individuals try to know 
(OT: 239-40).      
In the first phase (1775-1795/1800), as Major-poetzl (1983: 181) remarks, 
temporal concepts were added in the discourse, and so ‘time’ came for the 
front position, while ‘space’, which had been in the foreground in the classical 
tabular form of knowledge, was transferred to the background. Things ‘es-
caped from the space of the table’ (OT: 239) and cannot be represented only 
according to a taxonomia. labour, life and language started being conceived 
as having a temporal constitution and that is what Foucault means by a ‘his-
torical dimension’. Differently from the analysis of wealth, political economy 
will not look for the source of value in things or in the exchange of things, but 
in the process of production. 
Foucault denominates this new arrangement of thought by ‘the age of history’. 
‘History’ replaced ‘order’ as the main condition of possibility of knowledge. 
While ‘reason’ has been associated with the classical age, ‘history’ is related 
to the modern episteme. History will be the new ‘mode of being’ of things 
and became a new empirical science. Here, it may be possible to confuse the 
notions of history underlying Foucault’s argument. History was not in the 
configuration of the classical episteme because to know was to begin everything 
again, looking at the visible structure of the subject matter. Therefore, Foucault 
was using ‘history’ in the sense of searching for the past of knowledge. In the 
modern episteme, ‘history’ became essential in the meaning of understanding 
things as having a temporal constitution (for example, in the economic thou-
ght, wealth results from a process of production that is temporal). 
The succeeding course of time will be understood as something that is signi-
ficant. This resulted from a new conception of sign that emerged with the ‘de-
cline’ of representation. But Foucault emphasises that ‘history’ here is not a 
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[C]ompilation of factual successions or sequences as they may have oc-
curred; it is the fundamental mode of being of empiricities, upon the 
basis of which they are affirmed, posited, arranged, and distributed in 
the space of knowledge for the use of such disciplines or sciences as may 
arise. (OT: 219, emphasis added).            
 As well as order was the ‘mode of being’ of the things to knowledge 
in the classical thought, ‘history’ will be the ‘mode of being’ in the modern 
age: 
The History is going to unfold the analogies that bring together one to 
the other different organizations in a temporal series. It is this history 
that increasingly will impose its laws to the production analysis, to the 
organising beings, after all to the linguistic groups. The History gives place 
to the analogical organizations as the Order opened its identity way and 
the successive differences. (OT: 299 - emphasis in the original)  
That is, the unity of knowledge (savoir), the project of a general science 
of order (mathesis universalis), was broken. Between words and things, a 
number of unconscious elements were detected. ‘Sciences’ had now to think 
about this unconsciousness; man became an object and subject of knowledge 
and the human sciences emerged. In the new space of interpretation, the 
transcendental subject, who is the source of meaning, was separated from 
transcendental objects such as labour, life, and language. 
A new ontological conception of beings emerged related to the idea of ‘con-
tinuity’. In the classical episteme, there was a visible ‘continuity’ between/
among things, which allowed one to ‘order’ them. From the end of the 18th 
century onwards, if there is this ‘continuity’, it should be searched for within 
things. This related things to their history. 
Man found his finitude related to his power of knowing and his capacity for 
practically solving basic questions concerning life, labour and language. For 
the empirical sciences (biology, political economy and philology), he is a finite 
being because he is limited by the environment, by the forces of production, 
and by the linguistic heritage that have formed him (Gutting 1989: 199). He 
is subject to the laws of biology, of production and language. In economics, 
finitude is the realization of his limited conditions of making nature produce 
all that is necessary for his needs and desires. That is, ‘scarcity’ will have a 
different meaning from that which it had in the classical episteme. There, 
man should work in order to respond to his needs and desires. In the modern 
episteme, there will be a fundamental ‘scarcity’. The nature is not fecund, 
as was believed. Indeed, it is miserly. This new conception led to the ‘pessi-
mistic’ theory of Ricardo and to the principle of population of Malthus, for 
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instance.
But, at the same time, man was to fight for surpassing his limitations. For 
instance, because he is responsible for representation, and in order to be able 
to act as the subject of knowledge, he must build a language, that is a formal 
language, which can provide him the tools to surpass his limitations. There-
fore, language became an object of knowledge and some domains emerged 
or developed, such as analytic philosophy, formal logic and hermeneutics. 
Logic positivism became possible. The conditions of knowledge became a 
fundamental issue. 
At the same time, man was found in an awkward situation, given that he was 
converted into subject and object of knowledge. The human sciences emerged 
to investigate man. But they do not investigate man as a living, labouring, 
and speaking being. This was the task ascribed to the positivities (biology, 
economics and philology). The human sciences will be concerned with man in 
what refers to the relations between his function as subject (who he is; what 
he can know) and the knowledge of him as an object. 
While ‘the other’ was not manifest in the age of resemblance (being only 
implicit in the figure of antipathy), and was explicit in the analysis of differ-
ences in the classical episteme, it will be something ‘produced’ by the human 
sciences in the modern episteme. ‘The other’ in this new episteme refers to 
everything that is unconscious and that is responsible by the hidden meaning 
of the sign. For example, the ‘alienation’ in Marxism, insofar as it is a category 
created by the theory in order to refer to the ‘disjuncture of man’s existence 
and essence’ that results from the relations of production based upon private 
property (idem: 56). 
man began to perform two functions in knowledge that are complementary 
and constitute what Foucault calls “historical a priori” or anthropological-
humanist structure of the 19th Century thought. Firstly, man will be the 
object of the empirical sciences - life, labour, and language. Second, man is 
converted into philosophical fundament for the possibility of knowledge. It 
is this historical a priori that explains the arising of human sciences. Then, 
man is “a quite recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated 
with its own hands less than two hundred years ago’ (OT: 308).   
Whilst in the classical episteme man did not have a proper domain (OT: 308), 
in the modern episteme all that can be known will be deeply anthropological. 
Knowledge will be actually an ‘analytic of finitude’, which are man’s efforts 
to think about his own conditions of possibility as a subject of knowledge 
(‘fundamental finitude’) and object of the empiricities (‘founded finitude’). 
The place of the human sciences in knowledge results from a change in the con-
ception of human nature. Indeed, these sciences only emerged in the modern 
era, Foucault argues, because they could not exist in the configuration of the 
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classical episteme. In the classical age, the concept of ‘nature’ was underlying 
all the empirical knowledge in the sense that it was in the same level, so to 
speak, of representations. It was common to refer to others domains using the 
expression ‘natural history’7. There was a natural order, and man was included 
in it. It was in this sense that Hume proposed the investigation of principles 
of human nature, as Broadie (1997), for example, declared: 
When Hume spoke of a science of man, he was thinking of human 
beings as part of nature, and therefore most appropriately to be inves-
tigated by means proper to the study of nature. (Broadie 1997: 31)
Therefore, for Foucault, to consider Hume as a precursor of psychology reflects 
a misunderstanding of the conditions of possibility of thought. The human 
sciences are not studies about the human ‘nature’ in that sense. In the modern 
experience, the empirical contents of knowledge will be always related to the 
transcendental question of the conditions of knowledge. And there will be 
always the unthought, ‘the Other’, which is not in man or in things anymore 
(as it was the case in the classical way of thinking). In the modern era, the 
alterity is ‘born, not of man, nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, 
in an identical newness, in an unavoidable duality’ (OT: 326). The figure of 
man in the human sciences is always the ‘double-entendre of all answers’ 
(Cousins & Hussain 1984: 61). The question in the modern age is no longer: 
‘How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgements? [which was 
Hume’s proposal, for example] But rather: How can man think what he does 
not think? (OT: 323). The human sciences link the knowledge of empirical to 
what man is and what he can know. They link man in his positivities (living, 
labouring, and speaking) to who he is and what he can know. They do not 
study what man is ‘by nature’. They analyse what permits that man recognises 
himself as a living being, as a worker, and as a speaking subject. In Hume’s 
episteme there was still a regularity, for instance, that allowed the association 
of impressions (resemblance) through imagination, which derived from that 
conception of human nature.  
particularly in reference to economics, the conception of ‘nature’ changed. 
There is now something ‘exterior’ to man, which is not part of his ‘nature’, or 
even if it is part of it, it is always ‘unconscious’, ‘unknown’. 
The most fundamental question conducting the investigations became: ‘How 
can he [man] be that labour whose laws and demands are imposed upon him 
7  For example, Eugene Rotwein stated in the ‘Introduction’ of David Hume Writings on Economics: ‘the 
most basic level of Hume’s economic thought takes the form of a natural history of the “rise and progress of 
commerce” (Rotwein, 1955, p. xxxii - emphasis added). 
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like some alien system?’ (idem - emphasis in the original). 
3.2 Economic thought
The table 2 summarises the epistemic configuration of economic thought in 
the three ages: pre-classical, classical and modern. 
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TABlE 2. THE THREE EpISTEMES - MAIN CHARACTERISTICS: CONNAISSANCE 
OF ECONOMIC pHENOMENA




Classical - From Petty to 
Adam Smith
Modern - From 
Ricardo until today 
(?)








Mode of savoir Analogy: money 
is a sign because 
it is wealth
Analysis and order: wealth 
analysable in exchange
History: Forms of 
production differ ac-
cording to the pro-
ductive power of 
labour. 
Money Has an intrinsic 
value: precious 
metals 
Money is a pledge Money is a pledge
Value Value=money Value is only created in 
exchange; it is a function 
of a network of represen-
tations  
Value results from 




Interpretation Network of representa-
tions, in which money, as 
a sign of wealth, is what 
represents.   
Interpretation: signs 
created by Man 
History: Space/
time
- Space: wealth analysable 
through exchange and 
circulation.  Circulation 
is more important than 
production.  
Time: process of 
production involves 
a historicity, which 
is given by forms 
of production. 
Production became 
more important than 
circulation.  
Finitude - Production of land can 
provide the means to sat-
isfy man’s desires and 
needs.   
‘Scarcity’
SOURCE: Authors own work based on Foucault’s OT. 
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The most general change in economics in the modern era resulted from the 
view of the ‘organic structure’ of the object, which resulted from the concep-
tion of a historicity (temporal series), and finitude. Whilst in the classical 
episteme, space was the main figure in knowledge, insofar as the table of 
visible identities and differences favoured spatial relationships, in the modern 
episteme time will become more important than space. The historicity of the 
object was revealed. Political economy will seek for the source of value in the 
process of production. 
This is evident, argues Foucault, in the introduction of labour as the unit of 
value, which happened in Ricardo’s theory. The notion of labour was already 
in Cantillon, Quesnay, and Condillac. And Adam Smith worked on the notion 
of labour as unity of value. However, they were still in the configuration of 
the classical episteme, given that they thought in terms of a network interve-
ned by exchange. Smith related the concept of labour to wealth and saw the 
economic activity following a system of representations: 
(…) the quantity of labour indispensable for the production of a thing 
was equal to the quantity of labour that the thing, in return, could 
buy in the process of exchange’, that is, ‘all merchandise represented 
a certain labour, and all labour could represent a certain quantity of 
merchandise. (OT: 253) 
For Foucault, Smith was still analysing ‘wealth’ according to the conditions 
of the classic episteme. The Scottish thinker understands ‘wealth’ as ‘objects 
of need’, which represent themselves in the movements and methods of ex-
change. Nevertheless, Smith was indeed in the transition to the new episteme, 
since in his writings, a thing was representable in units of work; labour was 
analysable into days of subsistence; value was still a sign. value was defined 
on the basis of a total system of equivalences: commodities representing one 
another. labour is a fixed and constant value exchangeable in all places and 
all times. 
The distinction between value of use and value of exchange was previous to 
Smith. Cantillon had already pointed out the labour as a measurement of the 
value of exchange. The point is that Smith changed the relationship between 
labour and needs. Cantillon saw a man’s labour as equal to the value of what 
he needed to maintain him and his family - food in the last resort. Therefore, 
it was necessity that defined the value of exchange. Needs defined the value 
of use and the exchange values. The relation between wealth and necessity 
marked all of classical thought. But, although Smith had not changed the 
function of labour, insofar as he saw it as a measure of exchange value, he 
understood labour as an absolute, irreducible, unit of measurement. Whilst in 
the classical episteme, labour was a measure for exchange ‘relative’ to objects 
of need, Smith understood labour as an absolute measure for exchange. 
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In short, Smith employed the concept of labour to analyse exchangeable 
wealth; wealth is a representative element, but it does not represent objects 
of desire anymore; now, it represents labour. And, in this sense, Smith was 
in the transition between the two epistemes. In exchange, what is taken as 
the measure is not other objects and desires. It is labour. Within this dupli-
cation, Smith creates ‘a principle of order that is irreducible to the analysis 
of representation: he unearths labour, that is, toil and time, the working-day 
that at once patterns and uses up man’s life’ (OT: 225). If one object can be 
exchanged by another, it is not because men have comparable desires, but 
because they are subject to time and to labour, which is not just dependent of 
his ability or self-interest. Man’s labour is also subject to industrial progress, 
division of tasks, accumulation of capital, and division between productive 
and non-productive labour. 
 Therefore, says Foucault, Smith began a movement that surpasses the age of 
representation’s borders. His reflection on wealth is not ‘inside the analysis 
of representation’ anymore, and it is distinct from ‘the forms and laws of the 
decomposition of ideas’. It points to an antropology and open space for the 
emergence of political economy, whose object was not the exchange of wealth, 
but its production: forms of labour and capital. This was antropology, because 
Smith’s system put in evidence man’s essence.  
However, it was only with Ricardo that economic thought entered the modern 
episteme, because he was the first to work on the history of labour8. Ricardo 
promoted the substitution of the ‘circular and surface causality’ of circulation 
by the conception of a ‘linear, homogeneous series which is that of production’ 
(OT: 255). Production has primacy over circulation. 
The main difference Foucault identified between Smith and Ricardo is that, 
for the former, labour analysable into days of work could be used as a com-
mon unit of value for all merchandise. Commodities could be represented in 
terms of units of work. For Ricardo, a quantity of labour determines the value 
of a thing, not only because it can be representable in units of work, but also 
and more important because labour as a producing activity is ‘the source of 
all value’. value is not a sign anymore, it has become a product. value has its 
origin in labour and it changes according the quantity of labour devoted to 
produce things; but it does not change according to an increase or decrease of 
wages, Foucault stresses mentioning Ricardo. After Ricardo, it is not trade and 
exchange that are the basis of the analysis of wealth. labour is the basis, given 
that the exchange is based upon labour. Therefore, the theory of production 
was to precede that of circulation. This has three consequences:
A new form of causal series emerged. In the classical episteme, the 1) 
economic thought had provided explanations of how money could 
8 Major-poetzl (1983: 154) argues that this was a provocative claim, because Marx could be considered the 
first. However, chronologically, Foucault can be right.   
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flow into a country or out of it, how prices rose or fell, how production 
grew, stagnated, or diminished. From Ricardo on, labour was to be the 
causality without reference to anything else than something peculiar 
to it, i.e., the forms of production according to the degree of division of 
labour, the quantity of capital applied, etc. And when Ricardo promoted 
this dissociation, he made possible the articulation of economics upon 
history. Wealth became something that results from a historical proc-
ess. Value is a result from certain conditions of production, which are 
determined by the quantities of labour applied to produce them, that 
is, there is a temporal sequence of production. Economic thought is 
not spatial analysis according to differences and identities anymore. In 
what seems to be one more provocative statement to Marxists, Foucault 
declares that:
Even before economic reflection was linked to the history of events 
or societies in an explicit discourse, the mode of being of economics 
had been penetrated, and probably for a long while, by historicity. 
(OT: 256)
Another change relates to the conception of scarcity. This was a decisive 2) 
step for a theory of utility such as that introduced by the first marginal-
ists at the end of the 19th century.  In the classical episteme, scarcity was 
related to needs, which could increase or take new forms and could be 
satisfied by the production of the land. Foucault argues that this was the 
view of both the mercantilists and physiocrats. For them, labour applied 
to land made it possible to overcome scarcity. From Ricardo onwards 
the scarcity became more explicit in the definition of the economic 
thought. Economics started having a relationship with anthropological 
implications. That is in Malthus’s proposition of biological properties of 
human species that should be prevented by some remedy or constraint. 
Scarcity is also in Ricardo’s theory, which addressed explicitly the ques-
tion of population increase and the necessity of exploring less productive 
lands. Economics emerged as a necessary knowledge because of the 
fundamental situation of scarcity. man must employ all possible means 
in order to make the economic activity to overcome the fundamental 
insufficiency of nature. For Foucault, the concept of homo economicus, 
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as it emerged, is related to this fundamental scarcity. 
    
The last main consequence is related to the evolution of economics. The 3) 
‘rent of land’ is not due to the fruitfulness of nature as it was conceived 
in the classical episteme and even in Smith’s system. Nature was to be 
conceived by its avarice. Theories about the rise of population and the 
necessity of using progressively poorer lands emerged. Ricardo and 
Malthus, for example, have become possible, writes Foucault. 
 
Therefore, according to Foucault, Hume was not thinking according to the 
conditions of possibility of the modern episteme. Hume’s ‘political economy’ 
does not follow a conception of ‘organic structure’ or ‘finitude of man’ such as 
understood by Foucault. Hume’s main concern was ‘wealth’ and not ‘produc-
tion’. labour was not a fundamental notion to the understanding of economic 
activity, as was to be the case in Smith and, more precisely, in Ricardo. As 
Foucault argued, Hume’s economics was still focused on analysing wealth 
in terms of a system of exchange of objects of desire and needs. Wealth was 
constituted by elements that could be replaced one by another through the 
mediation of the representative role of money and that which it signified. 
Hume’s reflections on economy were inserted in this set of connections of 
representations. A system of exchange and circulation of money related 
wealth and money. He did not see wealth as being a result of different forms 
of production. Although Hume dealt with the development of industry, for 
example, and did refer to the role of labour for human economic action, his 
writings do not reflect a view of labour as being the determinant of value. In 
spite of his interest in history, he did not investigate economic facts according 
to a ‘historicity’, such as understood by Foucault in the modern episteme.  
4. Final remarks 
According to Foucault, Hume’s economic thought followed the conditions of 
possibility determined by the classical episteme. more precisely, the elements 
of his thought only became possible because of the change in the nature of sign 
that happened in the beginning of the 17th century. This led to the possibility 
of thinking of causation, uncertainty, probability, the role of resemblance 
and imagination, of man being determined ‘by nature’, and so on. Moreover, 
Hume’s economic writings were possible because of the project of a science of 
order, which allowed analysing the elements of wealth according to equalities 
and differences. All the explanations concerning economic activity obeyed a 
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kind of table in which all the ‘movements’ happened in relation to the role 
of money as a sign. That is, everything happened in terms of the reciprocal 
relations between what was representing and what was represented. Therefore, 
Hume was not a ‘modern’ economist, particularly because he was not thinking 
of economy in terms of ‘organic structures’. The modern episteme only came 
into being in economics through Ricardo’s theory, in which labour was to be 
the causality without reference to anything else than something peculiar to it, 
i.e., the forms of production according to the degree of division of labour, the 
quantity of capital applied, etc. Ricardo was who separated the notion of the 
creation of value from its representativity, making possible the articulation 
of economics upon history. 
Foucault’s characterisation of the conditions of possibility of Hume’s thought 
leaves some questions that deserve being explored, especially concerned to 
the argument that each age is marked by only one episteme and the fact that 
Foucault does not explain the shifts between epistemes. This is particularly 
important in relation to Hume’s cultural environment, as observed by Dow 
(2009). 
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